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Review
The First Amendment in Theory and Practice
Robert Allen Sedlert
The System of Freedom of Expression. By Thomas I. Emerson, New
York: Random House, 1970. Pp. ix, 728. $20.00 (clothbound), $3.95
(paperback).
The only way to describe The System of Freedom of Expression is to
say that it is in every sense a master work of scholarly excellence.
Professor Emerson has brought together his years of experience and
extensive researches into the area of freedom of expression and has
fashioned a comprehensive work that, in my opinion, must serve as a
starting point for any further exploration of the subject. He has indeed
developed freedom of expression as a system, setting forth its underlying legal postulates and demonstrating its application over the wide
range of what may be called "First Amendment problems."
It is Professor Emerson's submission that "[t]he outstanding fact
about the First Amendment today is that the Supreme Court has never
developed any comprehensive theory of what that constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases," and that
its failure to do so "has had a most unfortunate effect upon the work
of the lower Federal and State Courts, upon the performance of government officials, and upon the understanding of the public."' In a sense
the book is "addressed" to the Supreme Court, which, in his view, must
perform the largely unfulfilled task of "building a comprehensible
structure of doctrine and practice that is meaningful to all and meets
the needs of a free society. ' 2 It is the "basic legal structure of the
system" that is the subject matter of the book.
Freedom of expression in a democratic society, says Professor Emerson, rests upon four premises. Such freedom is: (1) essential as a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment; (2) an essential process for adt Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. BA. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Plitts
burgh.
1. T. EM ERoN, THE S rEm oP FREEooroF ExPRESsoN 15-16 (1970) [hereinafter
to page number only]. See also the discussion at pp. 717-20.

2. P. 721.
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vancing knowledge and discovering truth; (3) essential to provide for
participation in decision-making by all members of the society; (4) a
method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.3 These premises mean that freedom of
expression is a good in itself; other societal objectives, such as public
order, must therefore be achieved by means other than the suppression
of expression such as counter-expression and the regulation or control

of conduct.4 The conflict between freedom of expression and other
values, he points out, has revolved around what limitations, if any,
ought to be imposed upon freedom of expression in order to reconcile
that interest with other individual and social interests sought by the
good society. 5
It is this concept of limitations on freedom of expression that Professor Emerson challenges. He maintains that freedom of expression must
be given full protection and that other societal values may be sufficiently advanced by putting restraints upon conduct or action that
does not constitute expression, thereby recondling freedom of expression with other values rather than limiting it. The expression-action
distinction is thus crucial to his thesis and to the underlying theory
of the system of freedom of expression. Since expression is to receive
full protection, it must be protected "against government curtailment
at all points, even where the results of the expression may appear to
be in conflict with other social interests that the government is charged
with safeguarding."" The function of the courts, therefore, is not to
"balance" the interest in freedom of expression against other social
interests, 7 but to define expression and the other key elements of
"abridge" and "law" that are contained in the First Amendment.
These elements must be defined in a functional manner derived from
the basic considerations upon which the system of freedom of expression is premised." Expression is defined, of course, by distinguishing it from action, and when "expression-action" elements are

8. Pp. 6-7
4. P.8.
5. P. 9.

6. P. 17.
7. Professor Emerson says that insofar as the Supreme Court has developed any general
theory of the First Amendment, it has been the "ad hoc balancing" formula. Pp. 717-18.
In addition to criticizing the theoretical feasibility of the "balancing" test Emeron con.

tends that even its proponents cannot apply it in practice in a comprehensive way. See p.
718.
8, P. 17,
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combined, the test is whether expression or action is the "dominant
element." 9
Different legal doctrines, derived from these definitions, apply to
different kinds of protection which legal institutions must provide for
a system of freedom of expression. Professor Emerson sees most of the
issues as falling into three categories. First and foremost, there is
protection of the individual's right to freedom of expression against
interference by the government in its efforts to achieve other social
objectives or to advance its own interest. This has been the chief area
of legal controversy, and here, he says, the problem is one of distin

guishing "expression" from "action" and giving full protection to
expression. Where the governmental regulation affects conduct consisting of both action and expression, the regulation must be drawn in
such a way as to restrict only the action, leaving the expression unimpaired.10
Second, there is the fashioning of controls within the system of freedom of expression itself in order to regulate conflicts between individuals and groups within that system, to protect individuals and groups
from non-governmental interference, and to promote effective functioning of the system. The question in this area is whether there has
been an "abridgement" of freedom of expression, and it is necessary
to formulate specific rules for mutual accommodation of participants
in the system, fairness in the allocation of scarce facilities and assurances that the system will be expanded rather than contracted.11 Third,
the restriction of the government itself is necessary insofar as it participates in the system of expression, because of the special protection
needed by the system against the special character of government
expression.12 Finally, Professor Emerson excludes certain sectors of
conduct from the "main system," such as certain aspects of the operation of the military, of commercial activities, of the activities of children and of communication with foreign countries. In these activities,
he says, the functions of expression are different, and different legal,
3
rules may be required.1
9. P. 18. Professor Emerson's "expression-action" formulation is something very different
from the "pure speech-symbolic speech" distinction favored, for example, by Justice Black.
See the discussion at p. 71 9.
10. Pp. 18-19.
11. P. 19.
12. Id. Other legal doctrines are necessary to resolve particular jroblems such as the
places where First Amendment rights may be exercised and the relationship of the system
of freedom of expression to the system of privacy. Such issues, in his view, must be resolved
"on a functional basis, taking into account the objectives and operations of the system."
13. Pp. 19-20. I cannot agree with Professor Emerson's exclusion of "certain aspects of
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Having developed the underlying postulates of his system, Professor
Emerson proceeds to analyze what may be called the "substantive areas
of expression," that is, the functional situations where "First Amendment problems" have arisen. He delineates the constitutional issues in
each area, explains in detail how they have been treated by the Supreme Court, indicates often how they would be resolved under different tests such as "balancing," "clear and present danger," and
"incitement," and finally resolves them under his full protection approach. It is clear that the full protection approach, as applied by
Professor Emerson, would frequently lead to different results than
have been reached by the Supreme Court. We may consider some Ilustrations.
The "draft card burning" case of United States v. O'Brien,14 in my
opinion, demonstrates most clearly the difference in result between
the "full protection" and "balancing" approaches to freedom of expression. The case also highlights the contrast between the "pure
speech-symbolic speech" distinction favored by the Supreme Court and
Professor Emerson's "expression-action" formulation. The Supreme
Court treated O'Brien's action as "symbolic speech," and observed that
where speech and non-speech elements were combined in the same
course of conduct, "[a] sufficiently important governmental interest
in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms."'15 It found that such a governmental
interest was present there and concluded-in total disregard of the
legislative history and the circumstances surrounding the enactment
of the 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act-that the governmental interest was "unrelated to the suppression of freedom of expression." O'Brien's conviction was affirmed. Professor Emerson's
analysis is quite different. As he points out: "The burning of a draft
card is, of course, conduct that involves both communication and
physical acts. Yet it seems quite dear that the predominant element

the operations of the military" from the main system. I see no reason why persons in mili.
tary service should not have the same kind of First Amendment rights as persons in civilian
life or why the military "Establishment" should be able to impose restrictions on the freedom of servicemen to receive information and to discuss military and political matters.

The need for "obedience," "discipline," "combat readiness," and the like, which as traditionally been asserted to justify the distinction, seems to me to be entitled to no greater
-eight than other societal interests such as the maintenance of public order. If those societal interests, in Professor Emerson's view, should not be balanced against the interest in
freedom of expression, it is difficult to see why the interest in "effectively waging war"
should be. As to the situation in practice, see generally Sherman. The Military Courts and
Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HAsINGs LJ.525 (1971).
14. 591 US. 367 (1968).
15. Id. at 576-77.
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in such conduct is expression (opposition to the draft) rather than
action (destruction of a piece of cardboard). The registrant is not concerned with secret or inadvertent burning of his draft card, involving
no communication with other persons. The main feature, for him, is
the public nature of the burning, through which he expresses to the
community his ideas and feelings about the war and the draft." 10 Since
the burning of a draft card constitutes expression under this formulation, the full protection approach could lead only to the conclusion
that O'Brien's act was constitutionally protectedU
The full protection approach would invalidate sedition laws, in
their entirety, including those laws prohibiting "knowing advocacy
of force and violence."' 8 The permissible line of governmental intervention would be drawn only at the point where action actually
began. 19 It would deny legislative investigating committees the power
to make any inquiry into conduct classifiable as expression.2 0 It would
protect picketing "in or near a courthouse" 21 and peaceful demonstrations on the grounds of a county jail. 22 It would invalidate "race
libel"23 and criminal libel laws. 24 It would protect all "incitement"
except when it reached the point of action, such as specific instructions
to commit immediate particular acts of violence.2 5 It would return
"obscenity" to the protection of the First Amendment without regard
to its "hard core" nature except for "obscene conduct" that can be
classified as "action," and except for restrictions on "thrusting" obscene
material before others against their will or disseminating it to childrenm20 It would eliminate the "New York Times test"27 of tort liability

16.

P. 84.

17. Pp. 85-86. See also Professor Emerson's discussion of "flag desecration" at pp. 87.88.
The Supreme Court has been unable to resolve the issue of symbolic speech, See Street v.
New York, 894 U.S. 576 (1969), avoiding the issue, and Radich v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 1217

(1971), affirming a conviction for flag desecration by an equally-divided Court, Justice
Douglas not participating.
18. Compare Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), with Dennis v. United Stateg,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
19. Pp. 126, 160.

20. Pp. 277-79.
21. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.. 559 (1965).
22. Cf. Adderley v. Florida, 885 U.S. 89 (1966).
23. Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
24. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964),

25. Cf. People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 29
(1968). Professor Emerson's position is set forth at pp. 335-6.
26. See pp. 495-97. 1 strongly disagree with the "thrusting" exception and have reservations about "protecting" children from the "baneful effects" of obscenity. Conceding the
sexual "hang-up" existing in this society, I still see no justification in singling out sexual
expression for separate treatment.
27. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964).
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for defamation and invasion of privacy, 8 and would deny recovery
except for a "very narrow area in which disclosure of embarrassing
facts about a person or fictionalization of matter concerning him would

fall within the protection of the privacy system,"29 that is, would violate what Professor Emerson finds to be the constitutional right of
privacy. 30 It would hold unconstitutional the provisions of the Hatch
32
Act 3 ' that make political eunuchs out of civil service employees.
And it would invalidate the Federal Anti-Riot Act of 196833 on the
ground that it "seeks to punish conduct that never gets beyond the
state of expression."34

All in all, the full protection approach proposed by Professor Emerson as the underlying basis of the system of freedom of expression
would serve well the purpose for which it was intended-to give full
protection to the expression of ideas. Professor Emerson carefully
draws the line between expression and action in such a way as to restrict severely the power of the government to repress expression under
the guise of "regulating action." The "action" that he would exclude
from the First Amendment's protection generally involves the kind
of conduct that most libertarians would concede to be "beyond the
pale," such as shouted commands to a mob engaged in acts of violence,
a personal face to face insult inviting retaliation, shouting down a
speaker, or violent picketing. And when it comes to the application
of the expression-action formulation to particular cases, I find that my
disagreements with Professor Emerson are very few indeed3a The
system of freedom of expression that Professor Emerson has developed
then, and the expression-action formulation on which it is based,
28. The test was extended to fictionalized portrayal, included in New York's invasion
of privacy law, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
29. P. 556.
30. See pp. 544-48.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 7324.
52. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 380 US. 75 (1947), a divided Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act.
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2102.

34. P. 408. The constitutionality of the Act "on its face" Vas upheld in National Mo-

bilization Committee to End the War in Viet Nam v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969),
and will be considered again in the appeal from convictions of the "Chicago Seven." United
States v. Dellinger, No. 69 CR 180 (NJ). IIL., jury verdict Feb. 15, 1970), appeal docketed,
No. 18295 (7th Cir., Feb. 21, 1970).
35. One area in which I may have some disagreement is that of "expression uttered in
the context of a public assembly which may lead to violence or disorder." See the discussion at pp. 328-336. I would, I think, protect all public statements made during "riot conditions" even if they constituted "specific instructions to commit immediate particular
acts of violence." I would draw the line only at "one-to-one" solicitation or at "group
instruction" where the acts of violence did in fact result and a causal connection could
be established.
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represent a comprehensive and consistently valid theory as to the meaning of the First Amendment.
My reservations about Professor Emerson's system, and particularly
about the expression-action formulation, go precisely to what I consider to be its theoretical nature. In a society which in practice, as well
as in theory, held freedom of expression to be a primary value and
a "good in itself," and which in fact accepted the premises upon which
Professor Emerson's system of freedom of expression is founded, these
reservations would not exist. In this kind of society there would be
a correlation between theory and practice, and between the theoretical
solution proposed by Professor Emerson and the administration of
"the system" by those who staff the courts and hold the reins of governmental power. But I do not believe that we live in such a society or
that we are likely to do so in the foreseeable future. I do not believe
-conventional wisdom and judicial pronouncements to the contrary
notwithstanding-that freedom of expression is a high value in this
society. I do not believe that it is considered a "good in itself." And,
therefore, I believe that, "the structure of the system of freedom of
expression," if it is to be effective in protecting that freedom in practice, must take account of this unpleasant reality and adapt itself to
it. Let me proceed to develop this point more fully.
Professor Emerson has clearly pointed out the dangers that exist

to freedom of expression in this or in any other society, warning us
that "it is necessary to recognize the powerful forces that impel men
towards the elimination of unorthodox expression."2
say:

0

He goes on to

Most men have a strong inclination, for rational or irrational
reasons, to suppress opposition. On the other hand, persons who
stand up against society and challenge the traditional view usually
have similarly strong feelings about the issues they raise. Thus
dissent often is not pitched in conventional terms, nor does it
follow customary standards of polite expression. Moreover, the
forces of inertia within a society ordinarily resist the expression
of new ideas or the pressures of the underprivileged who seek a
change. And the longer-run logic of the traditional theory may
not be" immediately apparent to untutored participants in the
conflict. Suppression of opinion may thus seem an entirely 1plausible course of action; tolerance a weakness or a foolish risk.3
He makes a number of other points along these lines. In order to

36. F.9.

37. Pp. 9-10.
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maintain a system of freedom of expression, he says, the members of
the society must be willing to sacrifice individual and short-term advantage for social and long-range goals. The process must operate in
a context that is charged with emotion and subject to powerfully conflicting forces of self-interest. Those who favor "precise limitations"
on expression find it difficult to define and maintain precision, because the fear is of the consequences rather than of the expression
itself; the result is that repression of expression, like all preventive
measures, cuts far more widely and deeply than is necessary to control
the ensuing conflict. He also points out that the necessary imprecision
of the limitations allows a wide area of expression to be brought
within their reach, and places enormous discretionary power in the
hands of those who administer them. And these limitations will be
enforced by the government itself, bringing into play not only "administrative extremes," but the opportunity to distort the limitations

and use them for ulterior purposes. Finally, limitations are usually
applied in an atmosphere of public fear and hysteria, which puts intense pressures on the doctrines and the institutions to enforce the
limitations,3 8 and the very enforcement of the limitations upon some
persons or groups creates a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of freedom of expression by others. 39
It is these considerations, says Professor Emerson, which must be
weighed in attempting to construct a theory of limitations. This leads
him to the conclusion that: "A system of free expression can be successful only when it rests upon the strongest possible commitment to the
positive right and the narrowest possible basis for exceptions. And any
such exceptions must be clear-cut, precise, and readily controlled.
Otherwise the forces that press toward restriction will break through
the openings, and freedom of expression will become the exception
and suppression the rule."40
The theory of limitations that Professor Emerson has constructed
in an effort to avoid these consequences is, as I have noted, formulated
in terms of the distinction between expression, which is protected, and
action, which is not. It is precisely this formulation which causes me
to have serious reservations about the effectiveness of the theory in
38.

P. 11. The best example of judidal responsvenes

to "public fear and h)steria" in

the Cold War context, I think, is Dennis v. United States, S41 U.S. 494 (1951). Nor do I
think that the constitutionality of fordbly relocating American dtizens because of their
radal ancestry could have been upheld except during the days of World War I. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

39. Pp. 10-11.
40.

P. 10 (emphasis added).
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practice. I fear that in practice this "limitation" will not be "clearcut, precise and readily controlled." It certainly would be if it were
applied by Professor Emerson and probably would be if applied by
the Supreme Court (and insofar as courts are concerned, it is the
Supreme Court that is Professor Emerson's frame of reference). But
the world of Professor Emerson and the world of the Supreme Court
is not the world in which freedom of expression must be protected on
a day-to-day basis. The day-to-day protection of that freedom depends
upon the actions of government officials at all levels and upon the
positive intervention of state court and lower federal court judges.
I would submit that in terms of attitudes toward the value of freedom
of expression, the world of Professor Emerson and even the world of
the Supreme Court is not the world of government officials, of police

and prosecutors, and-if I am allowed to commit heresy-not the world
of many state court and lower federal court judges. If I am right in
my perception of that world, if I am right in my analysis of the strength
-or weakness-of its commitment to freedom of expression, and if
I correctly understand the "political-behavioral" component of its
institutions and those who administer them, the expression-action
formulation, for reasons which I will elaborate on shortly, will not give
"full protection" to freedom of expression, even if Professor Emerson's
expression-action distinction were to be adopted by the Supreme Court.
My view of the system of freedom of expression and its day-to-day
world is a view that comes both "from without and withln"-that is,
both from an academic analysis of decided cases and legal commentary,
and from a lawyer's experience in actual litigation. It is the view of
the academician who has attempted to be a "part-time movement
lawyer," 4 ' representing individuals and groups seeking to achieve
fundamental social change in their inevitable conflict with the "Establishment" that holds the reins of governmental and societal power.
In the process I have litigated a number of freedom of expression
cases, successfully and unsuccessfully,4 2 and have viewed a number of

41. There are many varieties of "movement lawyers." Some are full-time employees of
"movement" organizations. A larger number are lawyers engaged in private practice who
devote considerable time, generally without compensation, to taking such cases. And some,
like the present writer, are law professors who venture forth from the "groves of academe."
All share one thing in common-they are not popular with their "brothers at the bar"
and find themselves involved in disciplinary proceedings far out of proportion to their
number. Perhaps they are immoral as a class, but it might be that their Identification as
movement lawyer may have something to do with it. Thus far, most of the attempts to
"eliminate" movement lawyers have been unsuccessful. Sec, e.g., Sobol v. Perez, 289 F.
Supp. 592 (E.D. La. 1968).
42. For those that have resulted in reported opinions, see Mesurely v. Ratliff, 282 F.
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others "from within." Likewise my primary academic interest in the
First Amendment area has revolved around the protection of First
Amendment rights in practice, and my reference point has been the
"behavior" of the state and lower federal courts when called upon
to extend such protection.43 This participation and involvement on
my part has admittedly prevented me from acquiring the perspective

of the "dispassionate scholar," but at the same time I believe that it
has given me insights into the operation of the legal system that no

amount of reading of cases and law review articles and the other traditional tools of scholarship can supply. In any event, it is from this
perspective-and -ith this bias-that I view the effectiveness of the
expression-action formulation to protect First Amendment rights in
practice.
My analysis of the effectiveness of the expression-action formulation
is based first on the separation of the system of freedom of expression
into what I consider to be its functional components. Taking together
the guarantees of expression, assembly and petition, and relating them
to the First Amendment's underlying values and premises,44 I think
that there are three functionally very different, although sometimes
overlapping, objectives that the First Amendment seeks to achieve.
First, and from the political perspective the most important, is what I

call the freedom to dissent and to work for social change. Utilizing the
guarantees of expression, assembly and petition in their fullest sense, individuals and groups have the right to dissent from the policies pursued
by the government. They have the right to try to change those policies
and through the democratic process to try to obtain the reins of governmental power for themselves. In short, the First Amendment guarantees
the right of peaceful revolution, and the exercise of this right may not
be subject to inhibition and repression by those presently possessing
governmental power. This component incorporates the third and fourth
premises upon which Professor Emerson's system proceeds: namely,
that freedom of expression is essential to provide for participation in
decision-making by all members of society, and that it is a method
of maintaining the "precarious balance between healthy cleavage and

Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967); Black Unity League of Kentucky v. Miller, 394 US. 100 (199);
Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970); O'Leary v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
441 SAV.2d 150 (Ky. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 US. 40 (1969). Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Ky. 1971).

43. See Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change:
Reflections from Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. REv. 237, 269 (1970).
44. See Professor Emerson's discussion at pp. 6-7.
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necessary consensus." 45 However, it carries these premises a bit further
to emphasize that dissent and efforts at social change, no matter how
radical and sweeping, are an integral part of a democratic society.
Second, there is what I call the public information function, or as
Professor Emerson puts it in his second premise, the function of freedom of expression as an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth.46 Recognition of this function requires protecting
the dissemination of all expression and ideas, whether or not related
to dissent and social change, and in essence involves the societal "right
to know." Third, there is the matter of individual expression and association-the right to speak one's mind, to hear others, to belong to
groups and associate with others for mutual benefit, 47 to learn and
to enjoy the world of ideas. 48 Here the objective, as set forth in Professor Emerson's first premise, is to assure individual self-fulfillment.,
Recognizing these as the major objectives of the First Amendment
the question for me is how these objectives can best be realized and
given the maximum protection in a society which, in my opinion,
does not hold freedom of expression to be a "good in itself." The
soundness of any legal theory, I would submit, must be evaluated with
this consideration in mind. The expression-action formulation, it would
seem, would go a long way toward meeting the goal of full protection
with respect to the public information and individual self-fulfillment
objectives. While there may be hostility on the part of government
officials and judges to the expression of unorthodox ideas, freedom of
expression is enough of an "officially-approved" value in the society so
that they are likely to be responsive to the argument that the expression of unorthodox ideas-as long as this is all that is involved-should
not be suppressed. To put it another way, if the expression-action
formulation as developed by Professor Emerson were to be adopted
as the test of limitation by the Supreme Court, state court and lower
federal court judges would, for the most part, probably "accept" it,

45. P. 7.
46. P. 6.
47. Using this analysis in the area of "group legal services," a case such as N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), would involve the dissent and social change objective, while
cases such as Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), and United
Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967), would In.
volve the individual expression and association objective.
48. Even if those ideas would otherwise be considered "hard core pornography." See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
49. Seep. 6.
50. I would also analyze academic freedom as a separate functional component, em.
bodying all three of the objectives. Professor Emerson would not treat academic freedom
as an "independent right." See his discussion at pp. 611-16.
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and apply it in the "public information" and "individual self-fulfill,
ment" areas. While I think that these objectives would be better served
by the approach that I will be advocating, I feel that they would be
adequately protected under the expression-action formulation.
Where my serious reservations about the effectiveness of the expression-action formulation come in is with respect to the dissent and

social change objective. Stated simply, I question the commitment of
most government officials and of many state and federal judges to this
objective in practice. Since we have generally thought of the courts
as protecting freedom of expression from restrictions imposed by government officials, the attitude of the judges toward the dissent and
social change objective becomes crucial. While I base the conclusion of
"lack of judicial commitment" in no small part on my own experience,
it is equally demonstrated by the "judicial behavior" that is reflected
in court decisions involving expression directed toward dissent and
social change. Let me elaborate on my reasons for this "heresy."
Judges are generally an integral part of what has come to be
called the "Establishment." I use the concept of "Establishment" as
a loose term representing a combination of power and attitude, power
in the sense of "the people who are running things," and attitude in
the sense of an essential satisfaction with the status quo and resistance
to fundamental political, economic, or social change. 5 ' Using the
power and attitude criteria, not every judge is a part of the "Establishment, ' 52 but I think it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority
of them are. One usually becomes a judge in this country only after
and because of substantial involvement in the political process, and
this holds true for federal as well as state court judges. While federal
judges are not subject to the same direct political pressures as their
state court counterparts, who frequently must run for reelection, they
are still part of the "political establishment" and are subject to its
personal and social pressures.5 3 More significantly, they are likely to
believe in the "system" which they have served and by which they have
been rewarded. Persons who strongly dissent from that "system" and

51. See the discussion in Sedler, Book Review, 59 Ky. L.J. 578, 583-4 (1971).
52. Justice Douglas, of course, is the prime example of one who is not. On the other
hand, Justice Marshall has said that "[Wjhen black students confront him-as they often

do-with the charge that he is just a tool of the Establishment, he tells them that they
had better wake up to the fact that 'I am the Establishment.'" Yale Daily Neis, April 28,
1970, at 2, col. 3. Those who have the "Establishment" attitude, but not the power, can
best be considered as "supporters of the Establishment," or what President Nixon and
Trt-m Magazine have called the "silent majority."
53. See the discussion in Sedler, .supra note 43, at 254.
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who actively work to achieve fundamental social change are not likely
to become judges.
While the present social-economic-political system has brought to
power persons whose values are likely to be wealth-oriented and essentially conservative, I do not think that the attitude toward dissent
and social change would necessarily be different if a "peaceful revolution" were to take place and the reins of power were transferred to
those whose values are socialistic and radical. The judges of a new
"Establishment" may be no more disposed toward tolerating "counterrevolutionary" dissent and efforts at social change than their counterparts in the present system are toward tolerating that which is
"revolutionary."' 4 In short, if the dissent and social change objective
is to be protected, it is necessary to take account of the attitudes toward
dissent and social change on the part of those administering the legal
system, and those attitudes cannot be expected to be favorable no
matter what the social-economic-political complexion of the society
may be. While my "input" in this regard comes from observing the
system as administered by the "Establishment right," I am willing to
assume-and believe I must if my goal is to maximize the freedom to
dissent and work for social change-that the same problem will exist
if the system is administered by an "Establishment left."
The paradox, then, is that if the dissent and social change objective
of the First Amendment is to be effectively protected from governmental interference, it is the judges who will have the primary responsibility to do so, and they are an integral part of the very "system"
toward which the dissent and social change effort is directed. In a sense
they are being asked to go against their own self-interest and to protect
the freedom of others to bring down that "system" of which they are
a part and in whose values they believe. The paradoxical nature of
the process by which legal protection is to be afforded to dissent and
social change effort may explain why even the Supreme Court has been
unable to develop a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment.
It may help to explain the "straining" and "twisting" of legal principles
that was necessary to uphold the convictions of the Communist Party
54. As to "New Left" views on the value of freedom of expression, see Professor Emnerson's discussion at pp. 723-28. My own discussions with younger "New Left" people-and
I should add that politically I consider myself a part of the "New Left"-abott freedom
of expression have caused me some dismay, particularly when they make arginents st
tl

as "certain kinds of expression (support of the Vietnam War) arc so immoral that they
cannot be tolerated," and "repression by definition exists only in a capitalistic system,1
so that the imprisoning of "counterrevolutionary" writers in the Soviet Union does not
constitute repression.
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leaders in Dennis v. United States. You cannot, as I recall a political
science professor in college saying, "educate a man too far beyond the
confines of his belly," nor can you expect him always to be willing to
"sacrifice individual and short-term advantage for social and long-range
goals" 56 --particularly if he does not really believe in the social and
long-range advantage.
If this is so, it means that the freedom to dissent and work for social
change will never be fully protected by the courts no matter what
legal theory is adopted,5 7 because judges, being human and subject to
all the frailties and weaknesses of human beings, 8 have the motivation
to limit such protection, and given the opportunity will, consciously
or unconsciously, try to do so. The real question becomes whether it
is possible to maximize the protection that the courts will give, by
structuring things in such a way that the judges can be "persuaded"
to act contrary to their motivation and seeming self-interest.
This brings me to what I call "manipulating the system" and "influencing its behavioral component." The movement lawyer, or any
other lawyer who has had some experience defending the "unpopular
cause" or trying to protect dissent and efforts at social change, has long
been disabused of the notion of the "neutrality of the law." He frequently perceives a case as a contest between himself on the one side
and the judge or judges on the other, with the opposing lawyer playing
a decidedly secondary role. 9 The "game theory" in this contest seems
to me to be "forcing the judge to face up to the contradictions," and
the game works like this. Part of the "conventional wisdom" and the
"officially-approved values" is that freedom of expression is a "good in
itself," and the courts have the responsibility to protect it. This freedom of expression guarantees the right to dissent and to work for
social change. The Constitution (with all the historical and emotive
connotation that this word invokes) protects the conduct in question
in the particular case precisely because that conduct involves dissent
and efforts at social change. The hope is that the role perception of

55. -41 US. 494 (1951).
56. P. 10.
57. This is apart from the fact that judicial protection of constitutional rights as such
can never be fully effective because of the limitations necessarily inherent in the enforcement powers of courts, and the fact that they must resolve issues on a case-to-cse basis.

58. Legal education tends too often to ignore the "behavioral and human" component
of the system. In theory judges are "fungible," and if the "law" is properly fed into the
machine the result will be the same no matter who the judge is. The student is foon dis.
abused of this notion when he graduates or participates in a clinical program.
59. As an opposing lawyer once said to me following my usual "heated colloquy" with
a federal judge, "Boy, I sure wish I made the arguments that he did."
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"judge, whose duty it is to uphold the Constitution" will break through
and will overcome the motivation, conscious or unconscious, to suppress dissent and efforts at social change, thereby resulting in a favorable
decision.
The most important ingredient in this game is "the law."001 To the
extent that the "law" is clearly on the side of protecting dissent and
efforts at social change, the judge's room for maneuver is lessened; he
cannot in his own mind, and consistent with his role perception, 1
rationalize a decision denying protection. To the extent that legal
principles are "subject to interpretation" or the precedents are ambiguous or conflicting, the room for maneuver is increased, and the

judge is in a better position to come up with an "intellectually respectable" decision denying protection.0 2 From the movement lawyer's
standpoint, then, the game is played primarily by forcing the judge
"into a box," where he cannot intellectually reconcile the result he
wants to reach-which is to deny protection-with the result that he
believes the "objective application of the law" requires.
The above analysis is obviously oversimplified. It does not apply to
those judges who may be "playing a different game," 03 or to those who
have consciously faced up to the contradiction and have come down
on the side of the right to dissent and work for social change, or to
those few who are themselves "dissenters." Nor will it work with
those judges who will not "play the game," and who will deny protection with "malice aforethought" and with total indifference toward
the possibility of reversal. But in most cases the "game" can be played,
and must be played if dissent and efforts at social change are to receive
legal protection. And as I have said, the most important ingredient in
this "game" is "the law," or rather, the scope of manipulation and
interpretation which "the law" is believed to allow.
With this in mind, I come back to Professor Emerson's observation
that any exceptions to the system of freedom of expression must be
"clear-cut, precise and readily controlled."04 I fear that as applied to
the dissent and social change objective of freedom of expression, the
60. Another ingredient, of course, is the factual situation presented in the particular
case. Where the conduct of the government officials has been "exceptionally raw" or when
a severe sanction has been imposed or threatened, the likelihood of protection may be
substantially increased.
61. This may or may not include a fear of reversal by higher courts.
62. As noted above, the judge will ordinarily be motivated to deny protection unless
other factors such as "exceptionally raw conduct" are present.
63. "Different games" may relate to the judge's own personality and the kind of gratill.
cation he receives from his role.
64. P. 10.
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expression-action formulation will not meet the test. In the hands of
lower federal court and state court judges it leaves too much room for
maneuver. Except in the "pure speech" situation, it requires an initial
determination of the nature of the conduct and a classification of that
conduct into "expression" or "action." The motivation of the judge
will likely be to classify it as "action," and because there will be some
"act" other than speaking or dissemination, it may be "intellectually
possible" for him to do so. Professor Emerson would classify draft card
burning, for example, as "expression," but I doubt if most judgesstung by the insolence of the defiance and probably remembering their
own "World War II days"--would agree. There is enough of "speech
plus" in the conduct to make an "action" classification "intellectually
justifiable." Thus, unless there were a higher court precedent directly
in point-which is the "trump card" in the game-the judge could
with "justifiability" achieve the result he wanted, which would be to
classify the conduct as "action." In any event, the opportunity for
initial classification (with perhaps the implicit burden on the proponent to show that his activity was "expression") and the call for a
"two-category judgment"0 5 increase the judge's maneuverability considerably.

The point I am trying to make is that if the protection of expression
in the context of its dissent and social change objective is to be maximized, the expression-action formulation is not the best way to go
about it. If the judge's maneuverability is to be limited, if he must
constantly be made to confront the contradiction between the "officially
approved" value of freedom of expression and his own likely opposition
to dissent and social change, if he cannot have the role perception of
"judge" unless he protects expression, he must not be given the "power
to interpret" and the opportunity initially to classify the conduct as
"expression" or "action." Instead, the "law" must be that there is full
protection to all communication of ideas in any form whatsoever, and
any exceptions to this principle must be just that--exceptions-with
the explicit burden on the judge or the opponent of expression to fit
the particular conduct into one of the exceptions. The "psychological
shifting" of the burden, I think, is very important. The proponent

65. The classification must be either "expression" or "action," and there is no opportunity for an intermediate classification. It is analogous to a judgment of "guilty" or not

guilty" of a particular charge, which does not allow for compromise, and which cannot
reflect the reservations that may be present in the mind of the person making the judgment. As to the "two-category judgment," see D. JoHNsoN, TnE PsYC~toLoGy or Tuoucirr
AND JuDGMENT 326 (1955).
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would not have the burden of establishing his conduct as "expression."
Rather, once it appeared that the communication of ideas was involved
in any way, the particular conduct would necessarily be entitled to
protection unless the judge could establish to his "intellectual satisfaction" (and where appropriate, to the possible satisfaction of the
appellate court) that it came within one of the narrowly-defined exceptions.
What I am trying to do is to take Professor Emerson's basic thesiswhich I fully accept-and change the operational test from the expression-action formulation to one of "full protection with limited exceptions." Because of my agreement with the basic thesis of the book,
but my reservations about the efficacy of the expression-action formulation in the "world" in which freedom of expression must survive, I
want to try to develop a test of "full protection with limited exceptions," which I would substitute for Professor Emerson's formulation.
At this point in time I cannot know whether such a test would be
viable, and I have not considered all of its implications. Obviously, I
have not developed it except in a preliminary way. I am not sure what
all the limitations should be and of the possible consequences of
recognizing particular limitations. I am not even certain that I have
an underlying rationale for a scheme of limitations. I do think, based
largely on the "view from within," that full protection with limited
exceptions will be more effective than the expression-action formula.
tion in protecting expression in the dissent and social change context,
and possibly in the other functional areas as well. I do think that such
a test will give the judges less maneuverability and make it intellectually more difficult for them to deny protection. Most importantly, I
think that it will strengthen the hand of the proponents of dissent and
social change and of their lawyers, and as I have said, this is the perspective-and bias-from and with which I am proceeding.
What follows must be understood to be only a very tentative formu.
lation and subject to revision upon further reflection and research. I
start off with the proposition that: "The communication of any idea by
any person in any form whatsoever is protected by the First Amendment
unless that communication comes within certain designated and limited
exceptions to which protection is not extended." I have come up with
some of these exceptions, which, as I have said, are by no means complete, and which may suffer from a lack of a clear underlying rationale.
The rationale is not that every exception is necessary to protect societal
interests that are deemed more important than even freedom of
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expression, although in some cases this is true. Nor is it that with
respect to every exception the communication of the idea could be
achieved as well by means that would not entrench on other societal
interests, although this too is true in some cases. Perhaps the rationale

for the exceptions represents more than anything else a combination
of these reasons on some kind of sliding scale. In any event, I have
come up with eight exceptions that I believe to be sufficiently "limited"
so that they may satisfy Professor Emerson's criteria of "clear-cut, pre-

cise and readily controlled" better than the expression-action formulation.
One: The First Amendment does not protect violence committed
against other human beings or direct physical interference with their

movement. Ideas, of course, can be communicated by violence, sometimes most effectively. This exception does represent a value judgment
that bodily integrity is sufficiently important that it cannot be invaded
even for the purpose of communicating an idea. The qualification of
"direct physical interference with their movement" is designed to
limit the restriction to the area of actual rather than hypothetical
interference and to recognize that society may have to suffer some
"inconvenience," even with physical movement, so that expression can
be protected.66 Phrasing the exception in this way avoids the necessity
of determining whether the "dominant aspect" of the conduct is
"expression" or "action." If the conduct does not amount to violence
or direct physical interference with movement, it simply does not come
within the exception. This exception does not preclude the state from
imposing reasonable and non-discriminatory limitations as to time,
place and manner upon the conduct of demonstrations and the like or
67
the use of public facilities.
Two: The First Amendment does not protect serious destruction

of property. Serious destruction of property is simply, in my view, not
the way to go about expressing ideas in a democratic society. Destruc-

66. In O'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1969), four students were conducting a "sit-in" at the placement office to protest against military recruitment. They
sat in front of the door with their legs outstretched so that anyone coming into the room
would have to step over. They were arrested before anyone came, and I argued that the
"burden" of stepping over their outstretched legs was an "inconvenience" that had to be
"suffered" in order to protect expression, drawing an analogy to the "littering" in
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The court never reached this question, holding
that the students could be excluded from the building because "their privilege to be there
was subject to the will of the university governing authorities."
67. See generally Professor Emerson's discussion at pp. 359-73. Time, place and manner
limitations proceed upon a principle of "fair accommodation of opposing interests," designed to avoid conflict in the allocation of public facilities between expression and the
other uses to which they may be put
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tion of an individual's property may provoke retaliation, and so long

as a society recognizes "property rights," it does not seem fair that one
person's property should be destroyed so that another can express his
ideas. The qualification of "serious" is designed to prevent the application of technical trespass and general "destruction of property" laws to
minor acts which cause no real damage.
Three: Communications designed to produce or clearly having the
effect of producing harmful consequences due to conduct on the part
of others are not protected by the First Amendment. This is a hard
one, and I am not particularly satisfied with its formulation. I am
trying to include here the proverbial "cry of fire in a crowded
theater," 68 the use of "fighting words" in a one-to-one situation likely
to provoke retaliation, 69 one-to-one solicitation to commit a crime, 0
participation in riots or illegal action by "verbal commands""' and
similar conduct that Professor Emerson would clearly classify as
"action." I am fearful that this exception may be formulated too
broadly and that it might be used to uphold, for example, "incitement"
prosecutions against "inflammatory speakers." I think I am prepared
to say that in that situation the communication should be protected
unless the harm in fact results and is clearly traceable to the communication.
Four: Direct interference with another person's exercise of First
Amendment rights is not protected by the FirstAmendment. The purposes of the First Amendment are necessarily frustrated if those who
are "stronger and louder" can overwhelm their opposition. This exception would prevent disruptive acts such as drowning out the speaker
or physically removing him from the platform. It would not prohibit
"annoyances" such as heckling or picketing the speaker. This exception
is in part related to the "time, place, and manner" limitation, in that
it is designed to insure that all persons and groups have the same
opportunity for the public expression of their views.
Five: Physical interference with governmental or organizational
proceedings or intrusion upon such proceedings that makes their con.
tinuation impossible is not protected by the First Amendment. My
formulation of the exception in this way is designed to invalidate
68. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
69. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). and Professor Emerson's
discussion at p. 338.
70. See the discussion at p. 405.
71. See the discussion at pp. 328-36. As I indicated earlier, I may have some disagreement with Professor Emerson's specific applications.
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restrictions on "picketing near the courthouse" and the like. The
communication of ideas could not be restricted except at the point
where there was a willful attempt to stop the proceedings from taking
place. I would also be willing to recognize some restrictions on communication inside a courtroom while a trial is taking place or in a
legislative chamber. But the major thrust of this exception is to recognize that only the actual disruption of proceedings is beyond the pale.
Six: The First Amendment does not protect the willful infliction
of psychic injury on another, unless there is a clear public interest in
the subject matter of the communication. Professor Emerson has

demonstrated most cogently how it is possible to accommodate both
the interest in expression and the interest in privacy by recognizing a

zone of personal privacy where even expression cannot intrude.-2 He
also points out that the primary interest to be protected in the defamation sphere is the "psychic one,"73 and concludes that the "privacy

principles" are applicable here as well. 74 This zone of personal privacy
in his view protects "only the most inner core of the personality, involving the kind of intimate details of personal life that were the
Court's concern in Griswold v. Connecticut,'5 where the constitutional
right to privacy was born." 76 My sixth exception addresses itself to this
matter. I would probably expand Professor Emerson's zone of privacy,
focusing on the psychic injury rather than on the "intimate details,"
but the theory is the same-the interests of privacy and expression can
be accommodated by recognizing a limited zone of privacy from which
expression can be excluded. However, I would also allow for breaching
the zone of privacy in certain cases of clear public interest, such as
communications involving the personal life of public officials and
candidates for public office.
Seven: Violation of an individual'sspatial privacy is not protected

by the First Amendment. This recognizes that a person has a right to
escape anything, even expression, by retreating into a zone of spatial
privacy. This would, for example, protect a government official inside
of his home.77 Note that the exception is framed in terms of individuals. It does not mean that protestors can be excluded from buildings
72. See pp. 544-50.
73. P. 543. See also Probert, Defamation, A Camouflage of P4ychic Interests: The Beginning of a BehavioralAnalysis, 15 VAND. L REv. 1173 (1962).
74. P. 543.

75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. P. 556.

77. But not from demonstrations in the vicinity of his home. Cf. Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
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on the ground that they are invading "spatial privacy." Such protests

could be regulated only under the fifth exception (if they disrupted
proceedings) or under a reasonable time, place and manner limitation.
Eight: Communications in the commercialsector of society are subject to regulation appropriateto that sector. The commercial sector of
society is "crudely defined" by Professor Emerson as embracing "the
production and exchange of goods and services for profit, as distinct

from the production or exchange of ideas on political, religious, artistic and similar matters."78 In Professor Emerson's view communications in this area are outside the system of freedom of expression, which
means that different legal rules may be required to determine the
application of the First Amendment."0 The distinction between commercial and non-commercial expression is "well-established in our
constitutional law,"8 0 and I am willing to accept it. However, the fact
that expression may be somehow related to commercial activity does
not put it into the commercial sector for purposes of this exception,
Picketing or a consumer boycott, for example, to protest a company's
discriminatory hiring policies or its polluting the atmosphere would

be fully protected.81 It is only the "commercial communication" itself,
i.e. a communication made in connection with the production or exchange of goods and services by the producer or seller or a competitor,
that is subject to appropriate commercial regulation.
It is these eight exceptions, subject to modification or addition, that
would constitute the "exceptions" part of my "full protection with
limited exceptions" approach. There is very little, if any, difference
in the results that I would reach under this approach and the results
that Professor Emerson would reach under the expression-action formulation. It is my submission, however, that in actual operation, there
would be a significant difference in result under the expression-action
formulation to the detriment of freedom of expression in its dissent
and social change objective, because the expression-action formulation
gives the courts more "intellectual" maneuverability, and given such
maneuverability, I think that they would yield to the temptation to
suppress unorthodox expression.
I want to emphasize that the "full protection with limited exceptions" approach is predicated upon my acceptance of Professor
Emerson's basic thesis and the system of freedom of expression that he
78. Pp. 414-15.
79. See pp. 19-20.
80. P. 415.

81.

See Professor Emerson's discussion at pp. 448-49.
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has developed. I would change only the operational test, because I
believe that the test I have proposed will be more effective to protect
the dissent and social change objective of freedom of expression in
practice. This belief is based on my view of the system of expression
"from without and within" and of the "world" in which it must
survive.
If a primary function of scholarship is to influence the thoughts of
others and to lead them into their own "search for truth," the experience of reading The System of Freedom of Expression has served that
function for me. The System of Freedom of Expression represents
Professor Thomas Emerson's unique and invaluable contribution to
legal thought in the area of First Amendment rights. He has indeed
developed a system by which the meaning of those rights can be fully
understood and explored further. The book reflects both his lifetime
commitment to libertarian values and to the law as a means of implementing those values. It will serve as an inspiration to those who choose
to follow in his path.
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